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Georgia on the Brink 
By Thomas Goltz
Pressure from Without
The Georgian republic, the successor to an ancient society and culture that converted to 
Christianity six centuries before Russia, finds itself in a precarious state. Beset by 
serious economic problems, it is subject to attempts by Russia to apply pressure, 
including sanctions that often look like embargoes, to bend it to Moscow's will.
The punishment seems to be meted out due to Georgian resistance to Moscow's 
demand concerning the renewal of leases for four Russian military bases, which remain 
on Georgian soil despite an endless series of negotiations (including international 
requests) to remove them. Specifically, Russia has insisted on retaining partial control of 
the Vaziani military airport and full control of the Gudauta base, which would be run by 
Russian "peacekeeping" troops in Abkhazia - peacekeepers, it might be added, who 
took an active role in routing Georgian forces from Georgia's province of Abkhazia 
during the brutal war of 1992-93. Russia also is demanding a 15-year lease on the two 
largest bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
All this might be regarded as so much smoke and mirrors, given the fact that three of 
the four bases in question are in areas that, as a result of Russian intervention, now are 
beyond the writ of Georgia's government - Batumi in the "Autonomous Republic of 
Adjaria," Akhalkalaki in the all-but-autonomous Armenian region of Javakheti, and 
Gudauta, of course, in the "Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia" that, with Russia's help, 
was "ethnically cleansed" of Georgians during the war. As for Vaziani, close to Tbilisi, 
observers of the Caucasus privately worry that its "transfer" by the Russians might well 
serve as a pretext for arming plotters of an anti-Shevardnadze coup d'etat (along the 
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lines of the infamous closure of the Ganje base in neighboring Azerbaijan, in 1993, that 
led to the ouster of the late Abulfez Elchibey when the arms to be transferred fell into 
the "wrong hands").
Another stick wielded against the Shevardnadze government is the pending 
implementation of a new visa regime for Georgian citizens wishing to enter (and work in 
some capacity) in Russia. By some estimates, this economic dependency might involve 
over 850,000 Georgians - or nearly one-sixth of the population of Georgia (and a group 
that includes a number of individuals associated with the periodic assassination 
attempts against Shevardnadze). Interestingly, the new visa regime applies only to the 
purely "Georgian" parts of the country, with residents of the breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia being exempted - in effect declaring these regions de facto 
chunks of the Russian Federation.
Another Russian-initiated problem concerns the so-called Pankisi Gorge - abutting on 
Russian Dagestan, but close enough to war-ravaged Chechnya to have become a 
haven for over-the-mountain refugees as well as native, ethnic-Chechen criminal gangs 
- that has slipped away from whatever control Tbilisi once exerted. Russia's first deputy 
chief of the armed forces, Col.-Gen. Valery Manilov, has repeatedly "offered" Georgia 
"assistance" in dealing with the (allegedly) Chechen forces destabilizing the country, 
and has stated that Russia would be happy to intervene with troops provided "an 
invitation, a request, or an appeal for help" was received. A war- and disaster-weary 
Georgian journalist friend of mine, who was obliged to enter the gorge during a 
kidnapping crisis, seemed disinclined to resist.
This is, of course, precisely the attitude that Russia would like to engender in Georgia, 
and the role it played in tsarist times as well as during the collapse of the short-lived 
Menshevik (and anti-Bolshevik) government of Noe Jordania in the years 1918-21: 
Exhaust the Georgians into acquiescence, by forcing them to ask themselves whether 
continued adversity is worth the price of continued independence.
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Internal Pressures
Despite massive international aid (Georgia is now the third highest recipient of US aid 
after Israel and Armenia in per capita terms), the flourishing of an NGO-based economy 
based on Tbilisi's "hinge" position between mutually inimical Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and transit revenue from the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (and the promise of even greater 
revenues if and when the larger Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line gets built), the basic outlines 
of Disasterland Georgia remain the same today, in 2001, as during a previous visit 
seven years ago. Even the continued prestige lent the country of five million by the 
leadership of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has not helped. A 
beautiful land inhabited by gregarious folk, perhaps given to just a tad too much 
individualism and disrespect for anyone's law but their own, is still wracked by several 
simmering ethnic conflicts, a sustained and psychologically debilitating energy crisis and 
insidious corruption, as insiders admit.
Indeed, just how Georgia manages to exist remains one of the great mysteries of the 
Caucasus.
Much has been made of the chronic gas and electricity shortages this winter, the most 
celebrated of which occurred when the Russians switched off the tap on New Year's 
Eve, allegedly in response to Georgia's failure to pay a debt of nearly $180 million, a 
shortcoming for which the American AES company is blamed.
According to Michael Scholey, the director of AES, the Russian company that supplies 
gas for Georgia's main electric power generators, Inertgazstroi, cut off supplies in early 
December, claiming that AES wasn't paying enough for the gas that fires the generators. 
AES negotiated an emergency increase in payments, but on New Year's Day supplies 
were cut again, this time allegedly on the orders of the Kremlin. Once again AES was 
obliged to grovel for someone to turn the tap back on, but not before street 
demonstrations in downtown Tbilisi (and elsewhere) served as a reminder just how 
dependent the country remains on Russia.
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"For some reason everything is our fault," chuckled Scholey. "Blame the foreigners and 
put pressure on the guys with the big checkbooks. [But] It's much more complex than 
that. We have been attacking a lot of vested interest groups and largely have the people 
on our side... the demonstrations about lack of power were against the government, not 
us, and were more an outburst against corruption and incompetence.... Add to that the 
recent Russian dimension and you can see the fun and games we are having."
"We are up against the gun, and receive virtually no support from Georgia's alleged 
international friends to get over crisis after crisis," said Scholey, the most public 
foreigner in Georgia these days, who is stopped in the street to be praised or harassed, 
depending on whether his interlocutor has paid his or her metered electric bill. That 
controversial project (controversial because Georgians, like most other post-Soviet 
citizens, still are accustomed to receiving their gas, electricity and water for free, or at 
least not having their utilities turned off for non-payment) was part of a $45 million 
refurbishment of the electrical consumer grid, and only a part of AES's $224 million 
investment in Georgia.
"Had it not been for the AES investments, the Georgian energy sector would have 
collapsed completely," President Shevardnadze said in a recent radio address.
Other members of the government are more oblique in their praise. One deputy minister 
known by Scholey - and whom he declined to name - has been heating his swimming 
pool with a personal transformer, and has yet to pay a bill due to insider connections. Of 
course, using (or abusing) one's position in government to enjoy unsanctioned perks is 
hardly unique to Georgia.
Clearly, there is plenty of adversity in daily life in Tbilisi to be endured, the most obvious 
manifestation being energy. Even when Michael Scholey and AES can provide power, 
there is not always much relief. Various parts of the city blink on and off as if 
mischievous elves were playing with the switches of the power grid, leaving persons 
stranded in elevators and cutting off facsimile transmissions mid-page. When the lights 
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go back on - often in the middle of the night - radios blare and small floods of precious 
water gush in apartments where absent owners have forgotten to turn off the bathroom 
and kitchen spigots. The Tbilisi metro is frequently out of service, forcing those who 
actually go to work to walk or try to flag down cars driven by people who are not afraid 
of car-jackings. Gasoline is of poor quality (even if it is cheaper than in oil-producing 
Azerbaijan because it has been smuggled in at cut rates), while car repair is almost 
impossible due to a general lack of spare parts, unless you are a minister or mafioso (or 
son or daughter thereof) driving a Jeep Cherokee up to the Gudauri ski resort to get 
away from it all.
And that is the all-too-evident interplay between flagrant local corruption and flagrant 
freezing, induced by Moscow's gas games. With several months of winter weather 
remaining, the growing contradiction between Georgia's moneyed elite and the 
impoverished many will no doubt grow even more acute.
"Protiv Loma Nyet Priomna," say the Russians - a phrase loosely if accurately 
translated as "there is no shield against a crowbar." The gas games are just one of 
several blunt methods now employed against Georgia, in order to have the Black Sea 
state either acquiesce to renewed domination by Vladimir Putin's quasi-resurrected 
rump Soviet Union (in the guise of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth Independent 
States), or face internal collapse.
Indeed, Putin's attitude toward Shevardnadze's republic might be summed up by 
General Alexei Yermolov, who conquered the Caucasus in the 19th century. Explaining 
how he intended to deal with the anti-tsarist peasant revolt in Guria (western Georgia) 
shortly after Russia's annexation of the independence-minded country, Yermolov said: 
"Extreme poverty will be their punishment."
The adversity of life in Tbilisi is thrown into sharp relief by the hijinks of the new-
moneyed elite. Seven years ago, I had occasion to write of "the guys and gals on the 
slopes of the Gudauri resort in northern Georgia... dressed in their spandex jumpers 
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and gore-tex parkas, they preen at the midway station in anticipation of a playful aprés 
ski evening in the Marco Polo Club's disco and restaurant complex below, oblivious to 
conditions in the distant capital, Tbilisi, that seems literally light years away.... 'I come up 
every weekend to escape from Tbilisi,' said a young boogie board enthusiast named 
Irakli Toradze, who explained that he had an interest in 'construction.' 'It is in our nature 
to try and enjoy life, even in the face of adversity.'" Not much has changed.
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